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Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-
Reporting 
 
Zulkefly  Abdul Karim1 
 
Abstract 
Since the establishment of Grameen Bank in 1976 by Professor Muhammad Yunus2, 
many economists have studied extensively, either theoretically or empirically, the 
success of the Grameen Bank in eradicating the poverty problem in Bangladesh. 
Therefore, this paper aims to apply the mechanism design theory in microfinance by 
examining the role of joint liability and cross-reporting mechanism in the loan 
contract which designing by microfinance lender. In doing so, this study simplified 
the joint liability mechanism proposed by Ghatak (1999, 2000) and cross-reporting 
mechanism by Rai and Sjostrom (2004). Based on the joint-liability mechanism, it is 
clearly stated that the microfinance lender can minimize or avoid the adverse selection 
problem in the credit market through peer selection and peer screening. In the 
meantime, the joint liability mechanism is better than individual lending in terms of 
increasing the social welfare among the poor borrower, charging lower interest rates 
and generating high repayment rates. In contrast, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) argue that 
joint liability alone is not enough to efficiently induce borrowers to help each other. 
Indeed, the cross-reporting mechanism is also important for lenders in order to 
minimize the problem of asymmetric information in the credit market. The cross-
reporting mechanism is also efficient because it can influence the borrower to be 
truthful-telling about the state of the project and subsequently can minimize the 
deadweight loss (punishment) among the borrowers. In comparison, without cross-
reporting, the lending mechanism is inefficient because the borrower will be imposed 
harsh punishment from the bank and the bank can undertake auditing or verify the 
state of the project and punish accordingly. 
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2  In 2006, Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank have awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their 
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 2 
1. Introduction 
There is no doubt that the microfinance institutions (henceforth MFIs)3 play a vital 
role in alleviating the poverty problem and fostering social change in less-developed 
countries. Traditionally, a lack of collateral is a major obstacle for poor people in 
accessing credit from conventional banks. Meanwhile, MFIs have eradicated this 
problem as now the poor people can access credit without any collateral conditions. 
Indeed, MFIs also bring a solution to the credit market failures that stem from poor 
information, high transaction cost and difficulties enforcing contract. Therefore, the 
role of MFIs is becoming increasingly more important in granting small loans to poor 
people in order to start their businesses. According to Armendariz and Morduch 
(2007), the traditional commercial banks avoid loaning to poor people because the 
loans are small and the profits are typically hard to find and the lending is too risky to 
the banks  because the borrowers are to poor to provide the collateral.  In addition, the 
establishment of MFIs is also crucial for poor people in order to avoid loans from 
informal money lenders (loan sharks) who charge higher interest rates (usurious rates). 
  
Even though giving credit to the poor is a questionable, the experience from 
the Grameen Bank has reported high rates of repayment, often greater than 90 percent. 
For instance, a study conducted by Morduch (1999), in the ten years of the 
establishment of the Grameen Bank, the average loan grew from US $ 10 million to 
US $ 271 million and membership expanded more than 12-fold to include 2.06 
million members in 1996. For this decade, the Grameen Bank reports an average 
default rate of only 7.8 percent. In fact, this rate is still impressive relative to the 
performance of other government development banks. The success of the Grameen 
Bank has been replicated all over the world 4 . Many economist believe that the 
Grameen lending methodology has been successful because of the group lending or 
joint liability mechanism5, which induced the borrowers to provide mutual assistance 
in hard times [Besley and Coate (1995) and  Yunus (1999)]. Meanwhile, Rai and 
                                                 
3 According to the survey conducted by Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), in 2004 there are 
1000 to 2500 MFIs  around the world which serving some 67.6 million clients. More than half of them 
live below the poverty line. (see Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). 
4 Today, the Grameen Bank has been replicated in thirty countries from east Timor to Bosnia. Group 
lending programs also operate in thirty of the fifty states in the Unites States (Armendariz and Morduch, 
2007). 
5 In 2002, the Grameen Bank is shifted to a new system known as Grameen II which discarded the joint 
liability scheme and move to the individual loans. 
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Sjostrom (2004) argue that joint liability alone is not enough to efficiently induce 
borrowers to help each other. In fact, it is also necessary for each borrower to report 
the state of the project each other (cross-reporting). This means that both lending 
mechanisms either joint liability or cross-reporting complement each other in making 
sure that the borrowers provide mutual assistance, and subsequently can avoid the risk 
of default.   
  
The objective of this paper is to apply the mechanism design theory to a loan 
contract that is designed by the non-profit organization bank or MFIs and targeted at 
poor borrowers who possess the private information. Therefore, this essay is 
organized into five sections. In Section 2, will comprise of a literature review and 
Section 3 explains the Grameen Bank lending methodology. The two lending 
mechanisms, namely the joint liability and cross reporting will be discussed in Section 
4, and finally in Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review
6
 : Microfinance And Grameen Bank
7
 
Since the establishment of Grameen Bank by Professor Muhammad Yunus in 
1976, many economists have studied extensively, either theoretically or empirically, 
the success of the Grameen Bank in eradicating the poverty problem in Bangladesh.8 
For instance, many theoretical9  studies have examined the idea of group lending 
mechanism (joint liability) in the asymmetric information framework. According to 
the theory, there are four problems in the credit market namely; adverse selection, 
moral hazard, costly state verification and enforcement. These  problems exist 
because the lender (principal) is unable to observe the actions or agent types. 
Therefore, the bank (lender) has to design an efficient lending mechanism in order to 
minimize or avoid the asymmetric information problems in the group-lending contract.  
  
                                                 
6 A comprehensive review of the microfinance literature can be found from Brau and Woller (2004). 
7 The Grameen Bank is a non-profit organization, which charged the interest rates (20 % per year) 
below than market rates and others MFIs in order to promote social equity. Meanwhile, not all MFIs 
are non-profit organization. MFIs like Banco Sol of Bolivia operate with the intent to maximize the 
profit. 
8 A detailed discussion about the microfinance revolution around the world can be found from Hassan 
(2002). 
9 A recent theoretical studied of microfinance can be found from Stiglitz (1990), Besley and Coate 
(1995), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Ghatak (1998, 2000). 
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For instance, there are some studies which state that the joint liability 
mechanism can help to overcome the adverse selection problem, for example (Ghatak 
(1999, 2000),  Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Laffont and N’Guessan (2000) and 
Armendariz and Gollier (2000).  Another studies by Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee, Besley 
and Guinnane (1994) and Conning (2000) have discussed comprehensively the role of 
joint liability in solving the moral hazard problem. According to Ghatak and 
Guinnane (1999) 10, there are two reasons why the joint liability contract performs 
well. First, the perfect information among the community members. Second,  the fact 
that poor people may be able to impose powerful non-financial sanctions at low cost. 
Armendariz and Morduch (2000) and Bond and Krisnamurthy (2002) have concluded 
that the success of Grameen Bank is influenced by direct monitoring, a regular 
repayment schedule and non-refinancing threats among the group members. 
 
 There are several studies in microfinance that use the game theory and 
mechanism design approach; for example, Besley and Coate (1995) and Rai and 
Sjostrom (2004).11 Besley and Coate (1995) set-up a ‘repayment-game’ and found 
that group lending have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates when 
compared with individual loans. Any group member with a high project return can 
pay off the loan of a peer whose project is unsuccessful. This is a kind of insurance 
for the borrowers. The group lending can also harness social collateral and mitigate 
the negative effect. Rai and Sjostrom (2004), by using the mechanism design 
approach, argued that cross reporting could improve the performance and efficiency. 
They stated that cross reporting is essential in extracting the information on the state 
of the borrower’s project without undertaking auditing from the bank. The borrowers 
are assuming can perfectly observe each other’s outcomes. Once the project is realise, 
the borrower can make a decision on the repayment and then report it to the bank 
along with information about the others borrower’s project. Consequently, under this 
mechanism it clearly shows that the borrowers always report the truth about the other 
borrowers to the bank. Thus, the bank does not ever punish the borrower in 
equilibrium. 
                                                 
10 Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) have provided an excellent theoretical survey about how the joint 
liability mechanism can solve the problem of adverse selection, moral hazard, costly state verification 
and enforcement. 
11 Townsend (2003) has provided an excellent theoretical survey about microcredit and mechanism 
design. 
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3. Grameen Bank And The Loan Process: Group-Lending Methodology 
 The Grameen Bank12  in Bangladesh is the pioneer of group-based lending. It 
main characteristic is providing loans of a small amount (an average around US $ 120 
per loan or less, repaid at weekly meetings and has to fully repaid within one year) to 
poor people (particularly the women) for a self-employed project (poultry, paddy 
husking, handloom weaving, grocery or tea shop and dairy farming). At the Grameen 
Bank, borrowers are grouped voluntarily which consist of five members each and are 
formed voluntarily without any intervention or pressure form the bank. Five-member 
groups are considered an optimum size to maximize the benefits of ‘‘peer 
monitoring’’ and can also avoid the ‘‘free rider’’ problem if the group size is too large 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2007). The bank designed a mechanism in which two 
members of each five-person group receive their loan first. If, the entire instalment is 
paid on schedule, the cycle of the loans continue to the two other members in four to 
six weeks later, and finally after another four or six weeks, the bank will provide the 
loan to the group chairperson.13  
 
 Under the group lending methodology, all group members are jointly liable. 
This means that all group members are held responsible for loan repayment despite 
the loans being made to individuals. According to these rules, if one member defaults 
and fellow group members also do not pay the debt, all in the group are denied the 
subsequent loans. Therefore, this mechanism gives the borrowers an incentive to 
repay the loans promptly, to monitor their group members (peer monitoring), and 
encourages the borrowers to select responsible partners when forming the group (peer 
selection). This can minimize the incidence of default because the borrowers make 
sure  that their peers have put sufficient effort into the particular project.  
 
 
                                                 
12By December 2007, the Grameen Bank had 7 411 229 members which organized into 1 168 840 
groups in 80 678 number of village (center). Therefore, an averages there were 92 individuals per 
village and 14.5 groups per village. The female is the dominance members which contributed 97% 
from the total members. In addition, since the establishment of Grameen Bank in 1976 until 2007, the 
bank has cumulative disbursement (for all loan) by amount US $ 6 685.51 million and 2 481 the 
number of Grameen Bank branches. The data is taken from Grameen Bank 2007. See www.grameen-
infor.org for detail. 
13 The lending pattern that practiced in Grameen Bank is known as 2:2:1 staggering. 
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 After the formation of the group, within the first two to three weeks all 
members of the group are required to make small deposits to the bank. The Grameen 
Bank employees also provide training to the groups. In the meantime, the first two of 
group members are initially issued credit. The group is then observed for a month or 
two to ensure that the required weekly repayment (regularly scheduled repayment) is 
paid and the financial and social discipline of the group is maintained.  
 
 Another interesting feature about the Grameen Bank lending methodology is 
the establishment of a centre. Since the groups are  eventually tied together, the 
centres play a vital role to the borrowers for sharing the information, exchange of 
ideas and for solving problem arising in the projects. Specifically, centres are 
comprised of five to eight groups plus a secretary and are led by an elected 
chairperson, known as a chief. It is the responsibility of the chief to conduct the centre 
meetings and monitor loan utilization on a daily basis along with the group 
chairpersons. Grameen Bank employees are available to assist the centres in their 
activities and typically attending  the weekly meetings where the group performances 
are openly discussed. During the meeting, each group is required to submit a report to 
the chairperson and then the chairperson gives the report the Grameen Bank employee. 
In addition, the individual members of a group are allowed to individually select and 
identify their activities for which the loans will be provided. The selections are then 
discussed at the group and centres meetings, where the individual members can guide 
one another under the direct supervision of a Grameen Bank employee.  
 
4. The Model 
4.1 Economic Environment 
 In this study, the principal-agent framework is used in analysing how the bank 
designs the loan contract to the poor borrowers. The bank is a mechanism designer 
(the principal) and the agent is the poor borrower who possesses the private or hidden 
information14. In this model, we assume that both bank and borrower are risk-neutral. 
The bank cannot observe the borrower types but the borrowers can observe their types 
each other’s. The impoverished borrower ( )i  has no wealth which the reservation 
                                                 
14 This also refer the agency problems due to the asymmetric information, where the principal is unable 
to observe the agent’s type such as project riskiness,  effort and the profit. 
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wage (utility) is U . Meanwhile, the bank has the opportunity cost of capital ( )ρ  
which lends in a competitive loan market and collateral cannot be used because the 
poverty of the borrowers.  
 
 Suppose there are two type of borrowers in an economy; good-risk (safe 
borrower or s ) and bad-risk (risky borrower or r ) or { }rsi ,∈ . A project is 
undertaken by the borrower of type i  produces an output valued at ix  when it 
succeeds and 0  when it fails or { }0,ixx∈ . In addition, the probability of the project 
succeeding is contingent on the borrower types. The project succeeds with probability 
ip  and fails with probability ip−1 . Therefore, the project that risky and safe types 
undertake succeed with probability rp  and sp  respectively, which the risky type 
succeeds less often then the safe type or  10 <<< sr pp  where .1≥+ sr pp    The 
proportion of risky type and safe type is θ  and θ−1  respectively in the population. 
The principal (bank) knows the fraction of each type in the population, but is unable 
to determine which specific investors are of which type. Since the lender cannot 
observe output level, it can impose a punishment on borrowers who do not repay or 
strategically default. There are two components of loan contract namely individual 
liability component (interest rates) or R  and a joint liability component or .Q  It is 
assumed that there is no moral hazard, costly state verification and enforcement 
problem in the loan contract. Therefore, the lender only concerned with the adverse 
selection problem15 in designing the loan contract. This problem occurs before the 
contractual arrangements where the bank cannot easily determine which customers 
are likely to be more risky than others. If lenders could differentiate by risk type, they 
could discriminate the interest rates to the different type of borrowers. Nevertheless, 
with poor information, options are limited. Thus, in order to discuss a simple adverse 
selection model in the individual liability and joint liability contract, the adverse 
selection model proposed  by  Ghatak (1999, 2000) is simplified.  
 
 The borrowers are also required to report (cross-reporting) the state of the 
project to the lender. In the village economies, the borrowers often share information 
about each other in terms of outputs, effort level or types but the bank does not 
                                                 
15 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is the pioneered of the adverse selection model.  
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possess this information. Cross-reporting allows the bank to gather information on a 
problem borrower’s output by soliciting reports from her peers and showing leniency 
when all reports agree with each other. Under this mechanism, the bank must credibly 
commit itself to a system of reward for truth telling from the borrower and the bank 
must itself check on its borrowers monitoring activities. If a group member is lying 
about the state of a project, the bank can impose a punishment such as denial of future 
credit, imposed additional interest penalty or social sanctions. Therefore, the model 
proposed by Rai and Sjostrom (2004) was simplified in order to discuss the role of 
cross-reporting in the loan contract. 
 
4.2 Individual Loan Contract 
Under individual lending (without joint liability), the borrower si′  expected payoff 
when the interest rates is R is given by; 
( ) ( )RxpRpxpREU iiiiii −=−=  , sri ,=                                                                    [1]                               
It is also assumed that the borrower has a socially viable project that is the expected 
output of the project exceeds the opportunity cost of capital and the reservation wages 
as follows; 
Uxp ii +≥ ρ                                                                                                                 [2] 
Equation [2] can also be rewritten as a participation constraint or individual rationality 
constraint, as follows; 
( ) URxpUxp iiii ≥−=≥− ρ                                                                                      [3]
 From equation [3], in order to ensure that the agent participates in the loan 
contract, the principal must ensure that the agent gets at least their reservation wage 
(utility) or U . Besides the participation constraint (PC), the lender has to ensure that 
the individual loan contract also satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) 
such as; 
( ) ( )srrr RURU ≥                                                                                                           [4a] 
( ) ( )rsss RURU ≥                                                                                                           [4b] 
 Equation 4[a] states that the risky type weakly prefers taking a loan contract at 
interest rates rR  than a contract at interest rates sR , meanwhile equation [4b] is 
satisfied when the safe type weakly prefers taking a contract at interest rates sR  than a 
contract an interest rates rR . 
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 Without private information (complete information), the bank lends to the 
borrower at a risk adjusted interest rates in a competitive loan market and can also 
discriminate the interest rates according to the agent types (separating equilibrium). 
Therefore, since the bank is a non-profit organization and operating in competitive 
loan market, the lender zero-profit constraint (L-ZPC) is hold such as iiRp=ρ . By 
solving the lender zero-profit constraint (L-ZPC), the bank would charge the interest 
rates such as; 
i
i
p
R
ρ
=   ,    where sri ,=                                                                                            [5] 
From equation [5], with complete information the principal/designer will lend the safe 
type with interest rates  
s
s
p
R
ρ
=  and the risky type 
r
r
p
R
ρ
= .  Since,  sr pp <  the 
risky type succeeds and repays back less often, then  the bank can discriminate by 
charging the risky type with higher interest rates than safe type or rR  > sR . 
 
 With private information (incomplete information), the principal is unable to 
observe the agents type. Therefore, the bank is unable to discriminate against the risky 
borrowers and the interest rates become exceedingly high. In this situation, the bank 
will impose the same interest rates among the borrowers (pooling equilibrium). In fact, 
the risky type are subsidized by the safe type as the safe type pay more interest rates 
in order to ensure that the lender break even. Consequently, the high interest rates in 
turn will drive worth borrowers (safe borrowers) out in the credit market. 
 
 Since the repayment rate on the particular loan is the proportion of borrowers 
that repay back,  if the principal (bank) only lends to the risky type, the repayment 
rate is rp  and  similarly if the bank only lends to the safe type, the repayment rate is 
sp . In reality, the bank usually lends to the both type, therefore the average 
repayment rate is; 
( ) sr ppp θθ −+= 1                                                                                                         [6]                                 
Therefore, under private information (imperfect information) the principal will charge 
a unique (single) interest rates as follows; 
( ) sr ppp
R
θθ
ρρ
−+
==
1
                                                                                             [7] 
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 According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), under imperfect information, both 
type of the project have the same expected return as following; 
xxpxp rrss ˆ==                                                                                                            [8] 
Therefore, the expected payoff of safe type is less than the expected payoff of risky 
type as following; 
rs RpxRpx −<− ˆˆ    or  rs p
p
xp
p
x 





−<





−
ρρ
ˆˆ                                                            [9] 
4.3 Joint Liability Contract 
Group lending with joint liability16 can help to overcome the problem of adverse 
selection in the individual lending. This mechanism can improves inefficiency by 
enabling the safe types back in the credit market. In fact, it also leads to an 
improvement in reimbursement rates, a reduction the interest rates and an increase in 
social welfare (Ghatak, 1999). In the process of group formation, group members are 
expected to screen each other. Through peer selection and peer screening the 
borrower try to prevent irresponsible and credit risky individuals from joining their 
group.  
 
 Suppose that the mechanism designer (principal) offers a joint liability 
contract, such as { }QR, 17. If the agents accept the contract, they will pay the specified 
interest rates R  if the project succeeds,  but if the peer fails, the borrower is also 
required to pay an additional joint liability component Q  (jointly liable). Therefore, 
the expected payoff  of the borrower type i  when the partner is type  j  in a joint-
liability contract { }QR,   is; 
( ) ( ) ( )( )QRxppRxppQREU ijiijiij −−−+−= 1,                                                     [10] 
                  [ ]QpRpxpQRxpRppxpp jjijiijiiji ++−−−+−=  
                  = QppRppxppQpRpxpRppxpp jijiijiiiiijiiji ++−−−+−   
                  = QppQpRpxp jiiiii +−−  
                 ( ) ( )jiii pQpRxp −−−= 1   
                                                 
16 The detailed review about the joint liability theory can be found from Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) 
and Ghatak (1999). 
17 R  is the interest rates on the loan if the borrower succeed and Q  is the additional joint liability 
payment which is incurred if the borrower succeeds but her peer fails. 
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 From equation [10], given the joint-liability loan contract { }QR,  on offer, the 
mechanism designer requires that the borrowers self-select (peer selection) into the 
group of two before the bank approves the loan. According to Ghatak (1999, 2000), 
under the group lending, it can create a mechanism where the borrower has two 
strategies to match with their group partner. First, positive assortative matching which 
implied that the borrowers match with their own type and thus the group is 
homogenous in their composition. This means that the groups would either have both 
safe types and both risky types. Second, negative assortative matching where the 
borrowers match with other types and thus the group is heterogeneous in its 
composition. This implied that each group have one safe type and one risky type. 
 
 It is true  that based on the evidence due to the joint liability payment Q , 
everyone wants the safest partner in the loan contract. This is because, the safer the 
partner, the lower  probability of incurring the joint liability payment due to the 
partner failure. The question is what is the benefit to the risky type by taking the safe 
partner in the group and what is the loss to the safe type by taking the risky partner in 
the group? Equation [11]-[12] can explain further this question. 
( ) ( ) ( )QpppQREUQREU rsrrrrs −=− ,,                                                                   [11] 
( ) ( ) ( )QpppQREUQREU rsssrss −=− ,,                                                                   [12] 
  
Equation [11] refers to the net expected payoff to the risky type from pairing with the 
safe type instead of with the risky type and equation [12] is the net expected loss to 
the safe type from pairing with the risky type instead of with the safe type.   From 
equation [11] and [12], we know that, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QREUQREUQREUQREU rrrssrss ,,,, −>−   or 
( ) ( )QpppQppp rsrrss −>−                                                                                      [13] 
 
From equation [13], by comparing both equations, it is clear that the safe 
type’s loss exceeds the risky type’s gain. Therefore, under joint liability contract, it 
leads to positive assortative matching where a safe pairs up with another safe type and 
the risky type pairs with another risky type. Consequently, by rearranging equation 
[13], the positive assortative matching will lead a socially optimal matching that 
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maximizes the aggregate expected payoffs of the borrowers over all possible matches 
such as; 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )QREUQREUQREUQREU srrsrrss ,,,, +>+                                                   [14] 
 By assuming positive assortative matching18, the bank can design two types of 
loan contract { }rr QR ,  and { }ss QR , . Since the bank is a zero profit organization, it 
offers a group contract { }rr QR ,  and { }ss QR ,  which maximizes a weighted average of 
the expected utilities of a representative borrower of each of the two possible types 
subject to the several constraint. Hence, the mechanism designer problem can be 
expressed as; 
Max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ssssrrrr QRUQRUQRV ,1,, λλ −+=                                                          [15]   
where ( )1,0∈λ  may or may not depend on the size of particular type of borrower in 
the population, θ . 
subject to; 
( ) ρ≥−+ rrrrr ppQpR 1                                                                                             [16] 
( ) ρ≥−+ sssss ppQpR 1                                                                                             [17] 
( ) UQRU iiii ≥,  , where sri ,=                                                                                   [18] 
iii QRx +≥  , where sri ,=                                                                                        [19] 
( ) ( )ssrrrrrr QRUQRU ,, ≥                                                                                            [20] 
( ) ( )rrssssss QRUQRU ,, ≥                                                                                            [21] 
  
Equation [16] and [17] is the mechanism designer or the lender zero-profit 
constraint ( )iZPCL −   for the borrower type i (risky type in equation [16] and safe 
type in equation [17]).  Equation [18] is the participation constraint ( )iPC or 
individual rationality constraint for the type i , which stated that the agent must 
receive at least his reservation utility U  in order to participate the contract. Equation 
[19] is the limited liability constraint ( )iLLC  for type i  and equation [20] and [21] is 
the incentive compatibility constraint ( )iiICC  for group ii, . 
  
                                                 
18 Under positive assortative matching, the expected payoff of borrower i  under joint liability contract 
{ }QR ,  is ( ) ( )[ ]QppRpxpQRU iiiiiii −+−= 1,  
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The first order condition from equation [16] and [17] we get; 
rr
r
pdR
dQ
−
−=
1
1
  and  
ss
s
pdR
dQ
−
−=
1
1
. Both measure the slope of the indifferent curve 
among the risky and safe agent. Since rs pp > , and 
rs pp −
−>
−
−
1
1
1
1
, thus 
the safe type’s indifferent curve is steeper than the risky type’s indifferent curve. 
Figure 1 shows that the optimal loan contract  under pooling equilibrium can be 
determined at the point where the sZPCL −  and rZPCL −  cross each others, that is 
at point Eˆ (single-crossing property), which the optimal interest rates and joint 
liability is { }QR ˆ,ˆ 19 respectively.  Mathematically, by solving equation [16] and [17] 
with equality, for pooling equilibrium explicitly we get; 
( )
r
rrr
r
p
ppQ
R
−−
=
1ρ
                                                                                                 [22] 
Since under pooling equilibrium, sr QQ = and sr RR =  by substituting [22] into [17], 
we get; 
( ) ( ) ρρ =−+




 −−
sss
r
rr ppQp
p
ppQ
1
1
                                                                      [23] 
( ) ( )
r
s
sr
r
r
ss
p
p
pp
p
p
ppQ ρρ −=




 −
−−
1
1                                                                     [24] 
( )[ ]
r
sr
rssss
p
pp
pppppQ
ρρ −
=−−− 2                                                                          [25] 
( )
( )
( )
( ) srsrsr
sr
srsr
sr
pppppp
pp
pppp
pp
Q
ρρρ
=
−
−
=
−
−
=
2
                                                               [26] 
By plugging 
sr pp
Q
ρ
=   into equation [22], with equality we get; 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
sr
rs
sr
rs
r
srrr
rr
pp
pp
pp
pp
p
pppp
ppQ
R
11
1
1 −+
=




 −−
=−





−=
−−
= ρρ
ρρρ
      [27] 
 
                                                 
19 For a pooling contract { }QR ˆ,ˆ , the zero-profit constraint requires the bank to break even on the 
average loan such as ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ρθθ ≥−+−+−+ ssrr ppQRppQR 111 . 
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Therefore, under pooling contract the optimal Rˆ  and Qˆ  is; 
( )
( )sr
sr
pp
pp
R
1ˆ −+=
ρ
    and        
sr pp
Q
ρ
=ˆ                                                                   [28]                                                        
  
By assuming positive assortative matching (separating equilibrium), the lender 
can separate the agent’s types and can impose the different contract according to the 
group type either safe or risky. Therefore, there are two outcomes of separating 
equilibrium for any joint liability contract { }QR, . First, if  RRs ˆ< ,  QQs ˆ> , then 
( ) ( )ssrrssss QRUQRU ,, > . Second, if  RRr ˆ> ,  QQr ˆ< , then 
( ) ( )rrssrrrr CRUQRU ,, > . These two outcomes show that the safe group prefer joint 
liability payment higher than Qˆ  and interest rates lower than Rˆ . In comparison, the 
risky group prefer joint liability payments lower than Qˆ  and the interest rates higher 
than Rˆ . Therefore, with positive assortative matching the lender can impose the price 
discrimination  by charging each type at different interest rates ( )R  and different joint 
liability ( )Q . Indeed, joint liability lending can also increase repayment rates and 
allow the lender to lower the interest rates than individual lending. 
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Figure 1: Loan Contract Under  Joint Liability: Pooling And Separation 
Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 A  Numerical Example 
 Table 1 gives a hypothetical example about the interest rates under individual 
lending and joint liability. It is clearly stated that, under separating equilibrium 
(without private information) the lender can discriminate the interest rates by charging 
higher interest rates to the risky type than the safe type. In contrast, with private 
information the lender cannot observe the borrower type and subsequently will charge 
a single interest rate (pooling equilibrium) that is 11.43 percent. Thus, under pooling 
equilibrium, the safe type subsidized the risky type and subsequently the safe type 
will not participate in the credit market. In comparison, under joint liability with 
pooling equilibrium, the interest rates charged is 10% that is less than interest rates 
under individual lending. Indeed, joint liability will bring back the safe type in the 
credit market. 
 
 
Q (Joint Liability) 
· 
sp−
−
1
1
 (safe borrower) 
rp−
−
1
1
(risky borrower) 
Rˆ  
Qˆ  
· sE  
Eˆ  
· rE  
sR  rR  
sQ  
rQ  
(R)Interest Rates  
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Table 1: Interest Rates under Individual Lending and Joint Liability 
The Economic Environment 
• Lender’s cost of capital ( ) %10=ρ  or 0.1 
• Fraction of  safe borrowers in the population ( ) %50=θ  or 0.5 
• Probability of success, %75=rp  or 0.75 and %100=sp  or 1.00 
Individual Lending 
Separating Equilibrium 
Safe type 






=
s
s
p
R
ρ
 
Risky type 






=
r
r
p
R
ρ
 
Pooling Equilibrium 
 








=
p
R
ρ
 
Joint Liability with 
pooling equilibrium 
 
( )
( )sr
sr
pp
pp
R
1ˆ −+=
ρ
 
%10
00.1
1.0
=  %33.13
75.0
1.0
=
 
( ) ( )[ ] %43.1115.075.05.0
1.0
=
+
 
( )
( )( )
%10
175.0
1175.01.0
=
−+
 
 
 
4.5 Cross-Reporting Mechanism
20
 
Through cross-reporting, the successful borrower may be induced to help repay the 
loans of unsuccessful borrowers.  For example, if group member i  fails to repay, 
borrower j  receives a harsh punishment only if borrower i  reports that borrower j  
is withholding (lie) some output from the bank. This allows an unsuccessful borrower 
i  to pressure j  (the successful partner) to repay his loan. But if cross-reporting reveal 
that borrower j  could not repay borrower i ’s portion, he will not be denied future 
access to loans. 
 
 Cross–reporting can be related to repayment ( )iϕ  from the borrower, refund 
( )iπ  and punishment ( )iz  from the bank. Assuming we have two agents, { }2,1∈i  
which produced output ix . If  borrower i  successful the gains is m , otherwise is 0. 
So, { }mxi ,0∈ . Therefore, there are four possible states for the project; 
{ } { } { } { } { }[ ]mmmmxxx ,,0,,,0,0,0, 21 ∈= . Suppose the agent i decides to make the 
repayment rate ( )iϕ  to the bank by amounts  [ ]RRi 2,,0∈ϕ . If agent i  paid nothing, 
                                                 
20  Cross-reporting mechanism has been extensively studied in the implementation literature. For 
example see Maskin and Sjostrom (2001) for a recent survey. 
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0=iϕ , then he/she can send a ‘message’ ( )η 21  to the bank that his peer partner, that 
is agent j  was successful. Thus, there are four possible strategies which agent i  can 
choose such as { }[ ]RRsi 2,,,0,0 η= . If agents i  failed, she only can choose two 
strategies either 0  or { }η,0 . Agent i ’s punishment ( )iz  is given by matrix in Table 2, 
where each row represent agent i  strategy and each column is strategy for agent j . γ  
is the harsh punishment and ε  is a small positive number. Therefore the bank can 
impose the punishment such as γ≤≤ iz0 . For example, if agent i  chooses the 
strategies 0  and agent j  chooses { }η,0 , then the punishment ( )iz   from the bank to 
agent i  is ε+= Rzi 2 . 
 
 
 0  { }η,0  R  R2  
0  R  ε+R2  R2  γ  
{ }η,0  γ  γ  γ  0 
R  0  γ  0  0  
R2  0  0  γ  0  
  
 Agent si′  refund ( )iπ  is given by the following matrix (Table 3), where agent 
i  is a row player and agent j  is a column player.  Suppose agent i  chooses  strategy 
R2  and agent j  chooses 0 . This means, agent j  brings no money to the bank and 
not report to the bank that agent i  is successful, while agent i  try to repay both loans. 
In this situation, the bank gives incentives or reward to the agent i  with a refund,  and 
agent j  will be punished (for not reporting that agent i  is successful). Specifically, 
agent i  punishment is 0=iz , and her refund is επ += Ri , meanwhile agent j  
punishment is γ  (harsh punishment). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The message is interpreted as a statement about how much the other agent ( )ij ≠  should repay. 
agent j  strategies 
 
agent i  
strategies 
 
          Table 2: Matrix of Punishment ( )iz  
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 0  { }η,0  R  R2  
0  0 0 0 0 
{ }η,0  0 0 0 0 
R  0  0 0  ε+R  
R2  ε+R  0  0 0  
  
 Since Ri 2=ϕ , agent i  total repayment (net of the refund) plus punishment is 
{ } εεεπϕ −=−−=++−=+− RRRRRz iii 202 . Meanwhile, agent j  punishment 
is γ=jz  and her refund is .0  Therefore, agent j  total repayment plus punishment is 
{ } γγπϕ =+−=+− 00jjj z . By using the fact that agent i  wants to 
minimize the total repayment rate iii z+−πϕ , we can combine the fair 
( )
jjjiii zz +−+− πϕπϕ ,  for each strategy combination in matrix form as follows; 
 
 
 
 0  { }η,0  R  R2  
0  { }RR,  { }γε ,2 +R  { }RR,2  { }εγ −R,  
{ }η,0  { }εγ +R2,  { }γγ ,  { }R+γγ ,  { }R2,0  
R  { }RR 2,  { }γγ ,R+  { }RR,  { }R2, +− γε  
R2  { }γε ,−R  { }0,2R  { }εγ −+ ,2R  { }RR 2,2  
  
Therefore, for four possible states { } { } { } { } { }[ ]mmmmxxx ,,0,,,0,0,0, 21 ∈= , 
there is a unique Nash equilibrium. For instance, in state { }0,0  both agent pays 
nothing and report nothing, in state { }m,0 and{ }0,m  the successful agent pays R2  and 
the unsuccessful agent pays nothing and report η  to the bank. In the state { }mm,  both 
agents repay R  to the bank. In equilibrium, each successful agent has an incentive to 
pay for their peer and all agent will truthfully report η . In fact, in Nash equilibrium 
agent i  
strategies 
 
agent j  strategies 
Agent i   
 
Agent j   
          
Table 4: Matrix of  Strategy Combination 
          Table 3: Matrix of Refund ( )iπ  
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the punishment is not imposed in three states namely { } { }0,,,0 mm  and { }mm, . Only 
state { }0,0 , the bank will punish the agents with a smaller punishment { }RR, . In fact, 
the severe punishment is never occurring in equilibrium. Therefore, cross-reporting 
mechanism is efficient because the bank will impose a smaller punishment and can 
increase the borrower’s welfare in equilibrium. The result is summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Nash Equilibrium 
( )21 , xxState  ( )21 , zzPunishment  ( )21 ,Re ϕϕpayment  
(0, 0) (R, R) (0, 0) 
(0, m) (0, 0) (0, 2R) 
(m, 0) (0, 0) (2R, 0) 
(m, m) (0, 0) (R, R) 
 
4.6 Without cross-reporting 
Without cross-reporting, the bank can design a mechanism that encourages the 
collaboration among the group members. Meanwhile, for each possible state, the bank 
has to impose harsh punishments on the borrowers in equilibrium even when he/she is 
unlucky and defaults involuntarily. This is a deadweight loss. Even though the bank 
has unlimited enforcement ability (extremely harsh punishment), the bank is unable to 
distinguish between strategic and involuntary default. In this situation, the lender is 
unable to verify the state of the project. As a result, the lender would over-punish the 
borrowers under both defaults. Therefore, the successful borrower has an incentive to 
repay the unsuccessful borrower. So, without cross- reporting, it is not efficient 
because the punishment and  the deadweight loss is also higher. For instance, if only 
one agent was successful but that agent refuses to pay anything, it looks to the bank as 
a state (0, 0). Consequently, each agent must suffer a punishment at least R2  in a 
state (0, 0). This is inefficient because, under cross-reporting, for state (0, 0) each 
agent’s punishment is only (R, R). Therefore, the cross-reporting mechanism is 
efficient because not only the bank will impose a lowest punishment and reduces the 
deadweight loss, but it also encourages borrowers to share the risk and help each other 
at the lowest possible cost. 
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 On the other hand, without cross-reporting the bank can undertake auditing or 
verify the state of the project and punish accordingly. The bank would punish only 
when the borrower is lying about the state of the project. Therefore, the mechanism 
designer objective is to audit with sufficient frequency to discourage the borrower 
from lying. Consequently, in equilibrium to avoid the punishment from the bank, all 
borrowers simultaneously and truthfully reveal their types about the state of the 
project.  Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) in the costly state verification model22, show 
that in equilibrium the bank charged lower interest rates under joint liability than 
individual lending. In addition, the borrowers under joint liability are audited with a 
lower probability than individual lending. With a lower probability of auditing, the 
lender has experienced a lower auditing cost and subsequently transfers this benefit to 
the borrowers in joint liability contract by charging lower interest rates. Therefore,  
joint liability lending is more efficient than individual lending. This is because joint 
liability can encourage the borrower to tell the truth with a lower probability of 
auditing. Hence, with lower expected auditing costs, there is a greater social surplus, 
which is shared between the borrower and bank according to their relative bargaining 
strength.  
 
4.7 Others Lending Mechanism 
Besides the joint liability and cross-reporting mechanism, other lending mechanisms 
should be considered by the bank such as sequential financing, regularly repayment 
schedule and dynamic incentive. For example, Jain and Mansuri (2003) found that 
tightly structures instalment (regularly repayment scheduled) is a very important 
mechanism in order to avoid the moral hazard problem and can improve ‘fiscal 
discipline’ among the borrowers. In fact this mechanism is also essential in 
monitoring borrowers actions (screening and early warning system to the lender), 
allows the borrowers to repay in manageable bits and give incentives to the borrowers 
to diversify income sources. For instance, the borrowers from Grameen Bank are 
required to repay their loan in weekly instalments over a year, with the first instalment 
due immediately. Meanwhile, according to Jain and Mansuri (2003) the regular 
repayment induces the borrowers to borrow from informal money lenders in order to 
repay the microfinance lender. 
                                                 
22  Townsend (1979) is a pioneered of  optimal contract in competitive market with costly state 
verification. 
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 Sequential financing is also an important mechanism to minimise the moral 
hazard problem. In sequential lending, one borrower gets the loan while the second 
borrower is waiting for the loan. Under this mechanism, the second borrower only 
gets the loan if the first borrower succeeds to repay the entire loan (principal plus 
interest rates).  Chowdhury (2005) found that with sequential financing, it generates a 
positive level of monitoring by the borrowers. In fact, if sequential financing is 
involved with joint liability, it can generate higher repayment rates and can minimize 
the moral hazard problem. 
 
 Dynamics incentive such as progressive lending is also important mechanism 
for the microfinance lender. If the group members succeed to repay the entire 
instalment on schedule, their loans quickly increase in size. This kind of incentive will 
encourage the borrowers to have a good repayment record. Specifically, progressive 
lending schemes increase the opportunity cost of non-repayment and thereby 
discourage strategic default even further (Armendariz and Morduch, 2007). 
 
5. Summary And Conclusion 
This essay examined how the MFIs design the loan contract in order to achieve the 
social welfare among the poor borrower under the existence of private (asymmetric) 
information. Since most of the MFIs are non-profit organizations, designing an 
optimal loan contract is crucial in order to maximise the borrowers social welfare and 
at the same time to minimize or avoid the problem of asymmetric information among 
the borrowers. Therefore, the joint liability theory has been analysed by using the 
main problem in the credit market namely adverse selection. Based on joint liability 
theory, it is clearly stated that this mechanism is better than individual lending in term 
of high repayment rates, lower interest rates and an increase social welfare. Joint 
liability is also a good mechanism to minimize or avoid the adverse selection problem 
through peer selection and peer screening.  
 
 The cross-reporting mechanism is also important for lenders in order to 
minimize the problem of asymmetric information in the credit market. This lending 
mechanism is also efficient because the tendency of the borrower to be truthful-telling 
about the state of the project and subsequently can minimize the deadweight loss 
(punishment) among the borrowers. In contrast, without cross-reporting, the lending 
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mechanism is inefficient because the borrower will be imposed harsh punishment 
from the bank. On the other hand, other lending mechanisms such as regular 
repayment schedules, sequential financing and progressive lending are also essential 
to the microfinance in order to minimize the problem of private information in the 
credit market. Therefore, the various combinations of lending mechanism are pivotal 
for the MFIs in minimizing the adverse selection problem in the credit market. 
 
 In addition, besides the adverse selection problem, future research should 
focus on  other problems in the credit market such as moral hazard, costly state 
verification and  enforcement in the MFIs environment through an empirical or 
theoretical study. In fact, further studies should also focus on the effectiveness of 
various lending mechanisms and how the mechanisms operate together through 
experimental approach and systematic evaluation. Finally, it is also crucial to identify 
what really drives the MFIs performance and the assessment of the impact of MFIs 
lending to the poor borrower. 
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